The heretofore untold story o f Abraham Flexner s role in the establishment of the first endowed schools o f public health (Johns Hopkins and Harvard) provides an un usual window through which to view the historic struggle o f public health doctors to resolve their identity problem. They have become a profession, nominally a part of and yet fundamentally different from that o f the physician in patient care. Nonetheless, the primary qualification for leadership in public health still is con sidered an M.D. degree rather than a Dr.P.H. or some equivalent. The author analyzes the characteristic inability o f public health leaders to support their grand vi sions in times critical for decision, and calls on the modern community health educator, planner, and organizer to face the explicit question that all but a few of his public health forebears have sidestepped: Is public health a branch o f medicine? Are education and training for clinical medicine desirable preparation for a career in public health, or does this simply doom one essential profession to remain subor dinate to another?
States is concerned begins in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, where American public health, in its earliest growth and develop ment, showed great promise.
One will find nothing about health in the Constitution of the United States, but that was a product of Philadelphia. In Boston, in 1797, Massachusetts legislated the "Great Public Health Act," authorizing towns and districts to appoint health committees or health officers, offices open to laymen. Some towns established such agencies. Another half-century passed, however, before anyone ad vocated public health as a career.
Lemuel Shattuck-not a physician but a teacher who went into the book-publishing-marked the need for such a career in his Report o f a General Plan for the Promotion o f Public and Personal Health, presented to the Massachusetts legislature in 1850. In the course of producing, in the words of Charles-Edward A. Winslow, "perhaps the most significant single document in the history of public health," Shattuck observed: "Sanitary professorships should be established in all our colleges and filled with competent teachers." Shattuck, finding his inspiration in the sanitary movement begun in England during the previous decade under the leadership of Edwin Chadwick, got into the subject out of his interest in genealogy. This led him into vital statistics, the abacus of public health. Boston became the birthplace of the American Statistical Association, thanks to Shattuck and his predecessor, the Reverend Edward Wigglesworth. The latter in 1789 read all the bills of mor tality for Massachusetts and New Hampshire as collected by town clerks and church parishes for the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
With a clarity of mind that has pleased modern actuaries, Wig glesworth prepared the first American mortality table, showing that 40 percent of the deaths that year were in children under five and that the average life expectancy was only 28.15 years. Shattuck in turn found that life expectancy in Boston was 21.4 years in 1840. With this information, he persuaded the governor to let him head a committee to make a sanitary survey of the state, at a cost of $500.
Shattuck's report was of prophetic value because it com prehended people's health as public business, a view which many in dependent physicians eventually managed to translate as "govern ment interference with the practice of medicine." He visualized the dent, in 1909, was to create a full-time salaried chair in a new department of preventive medicine and hygiene, appointing Milton J. Rosenau to this position. Rosenau was director of the Public Health Service Hygienic Laboratory in Washington, the training center for PHS commissioned officers. Rosenau offered the first Harvard doctoral degree in public health in 1911 and by 1920 had awarded twenty degrees.
Presumably it was Rosenau who gave the new Harvard presi dent, A. Lawrence Lowell, the idea of starting a School for Health Officers. Lowell in 1912 invited Professor Whipple to lunch and proposed that he cooperate with Professor Sedgwick of MIT and Dr. Rosenau of the Harvard medical faculty in a course for health professionals. With MIT encouragement, Rosenau submitted a plan for a combined Harvard-MIT faculty to teach hygiene, sanitation, preventive medicine, and sanitary engineering. A fee of $250 would be charged each regular student for a one-year course Jeading to a certificate (CPH) issued jointly by the two institutions. It would be open to physicians or other persons with at least two years of college work plus two years of basic medical sciences or sanitary engineer ing.
Lowell approved the plan, but expressed surprise to Rosenau at the emphasis on doctors of medicine, as he had understood that of ficers or members of boards of health who were not doctors would be accepted. Rosenau reassured Lowell that a medical degree was not a rigid requirement.
Sedgwick became chairman; Rosenau, director; and Whipple, secretary of the Harvard-MIT School for Health Officers, a triple threat team inclusing a physician, a biologist, and a sanitary engineer. The school opened in September 1913 with five regular and three special students. The public announcement (Rockefeller Archives Center, 1913-1958: RF, IHD files) stated the intention:
The object of this School is to prepare young men for public health work, especially to fit them to occupy administrative and ex ecutive positions such as health officers or members of boards of health, as well as secretaries, agents, and inspectors of health organizations . . .
The medical degree is not in any way prerequisite for admission although the Administrative Board strongly urges men who intend to specialize in public health work to take the degree of M.D. before they become members of the School for Health Officers.
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The medical bias in the above disclaimer was transparent, but it did have the advantage of side-stepping the fact that Harvard and MIT were not empowered by their charters to award a joint academic degree, nor at this point did either institution wish to contemplate such a possibility. Curran (1970) remarked that the school was realistically organized at " practically a vocational" level to meet the current need for high-grade instruction and laboratory experience by personnel already occupying posts in government and voluntary health organizations.
Certainly the School for Health Officers was a typically Boston kind of humanistic enterprise, born on a shoestring out of a sense of social need and a spirit of cooperation, sublimely crossing rigid lines of authority and organization. The fact that the experiment would cost neither Harvard nor MIT anything to operate helped overcome faculty anxieties about new competition for budgeted funds. The school began by borrowing $500 each from Harvard and MIT for start-up expenses, to be repaid out of tuition. By 1914, the school was able to present a financial statement showing expenditures of $1,490.99 and a balance of $1,538.70, including the $1,000 loan. From then on, the school never was in the red.
For faculty, the School for Health Officers called on 20 Har vard and MIT professors to give "exercises" for fees ranging from $10 to $100 per lecture or course, or a grand total of $745 for the first year. No university, how ever richly endowed, has assembled a more talented faculty.
Here was Richard C. Cabot, founder of the medical teaching device, the clinical pathology conference (CPC), and his colleague, Ida Cannon, the first medical social worker, receiving $10 each for lectures on social services .... Theobald Smith, a famous microbe hunter, the first man to discover an insect-borne disease (Texas cat tle fever), $50 for eight lectures on the relation of veterinary diseases to public health .... Otto Folin, a pioneer in biochemistry who dis covered the urine test for sugar so important in the diagnosis of diabetes, $15 for a laboratory course in biological chemistry . . . Richard P. Strong, first to discover salvarsan as a cure for yaws, who had his own Harvard School of Tropical Medicine, $50 for a lecture and laboratory exercise in tropical hygiene . . . Walter B. Cannon, all-time great American physiologist and pioneer in the problem-solving method of teaching students, $50 for six lectures on personal hygiene. The Nobel Foundation finally conceded that Can non made three different contributions eligible for the Nobel Prize, although he was passed over each time (Schuck et al., 1951) .
Finally, there were the three musketeers of practical public health, Sedgwick, Whipple, and Rosenau. They taught epidemiol ogy, demography, and preventive medicine. There was even a course in public health administration, probably the first ever offered in an American university.
By modern foundation standards, a program having this much take-off power without help, if it was within the foundation's program interests, would rate as "irresistible" if it asked for help. In Rosenau's judgment, the experiment lacked only one thing; when, in 1915, Flexner asked what it was, Rosenau replied: "Money." Money, in the star-crossed fund-raising days lying immediately ahead, was the one thing the school could not find, in sums larger than tuition and lecture fees.
The School for Health Officers lasted nine years without en dowment or outside gift. In this time, it issued 82 certificates of public health, 55 of them to doctors of medicine, 27 to others. In ad dition, 93 special students took courses. The average therefore was about 19 students per year. When the school ended its classes and closed its books in June 1922, it had a balance of $7,253.54 on hand. Its only liability had been an inability to offer an academic degree of any kind, a deficiency that substantial outside support could readily have resolved.
What The Johns Hopkins University, founded in 1876, es tablished in medical education, in 1893, was a true university medical center, with the medical school as a department of the un iversity and the hospital closely integrated with the medical school, all centered around a full-time faculty in the basic sciences and a closed clinical faculty dividing its time among patient care, teaching, and research. The emphasis was on the study of diseases by laboratory scientists and clinical investigators. But patients came to seek the attention of William Osier and other famed physicians and surgeons in numbers exceeding facilities to care for them. The outcome was the familiar ivory-tower complex in which the faculty wishes to limit community service while the community demands it be expanded (Williams, 1965).
Welch, Johns Hopkins' first professor of pathology (1884) and first dean of the Medical School (1893) was brilliantly fitted to cope with these centripetal and centrifugal forces of medical academia. Furthermore, he regarded scientific research as the key to integra tion of medicine and public health.
Billings had discussed the fact that the average practitioner is little adapted by his medical education to investigate the causes of diseases and their prevention-the intellectual core of the public health doctor's way of life. He wanted Johns Hopkins to implant a public health curriculum in its medical school and offer a graduate degree in it.
Welch agreed. He wanted to organize an Institute of Hygiene, in the German mode. Every American physician worth his scientific salt wanted to study under the Herr Geheimrat system of medical education in Germany in those days. Welch in 1884 visited the In stitute of Hygiene founded by Max von Pettenkoffer in Munich. His laboratory had, through soil and water sanitation, controlled typhoid fever epidemics before it accepted the germ theory of dis ease. As a matter of fact, von Pettenkoffer was quite upset by the new science of bacteriology and its doctrine of specific pathogens; it was monopolizing the attention of his hygienists. Like the English, he himself had focused his attention on the chemical purity of the physical environment as nature's way to good health. It was good hygiene.
Welch tried repeatedly to develop an interest in hygiene among the faculty and students in Baltimore, but with little luck. Although it was generally thought that the country was a healthier place to live than the city, there was some evidence to the contrary, particularly in the situation that Rockefeller Sanitary Commission health workers like Benjamin E. Washburn (1955) were finding in the rural South. " Early in my practice," wrote this general practitioner from North Carolina, " I learned that the usual point of view as regards health was that everybody was more or less ill."
In some areas of the South, as many as one in 50 mothers died in childbirth and one in four babies did not live to see their first birthday. Rapidly fatal pneumonia was not just the old man's friend, but a stalking companion of youth. It was God's will that somebody from the family or neighborhood be taken to the cemetery every year-by tuberculosis, dysentery, typhoid fever, or anemia associated with malnutrition, hookworm infection, or malaria. As Rose wrote in his RSC annual report for 1911, effective hookworm control depended on a strong state health department and "finally, in each county, a capable county superintendent of health devoting his whole time to public health work." He con tinued: "At present the county health officer in most counties is a practicing physician; he is paid an insignificant sum [and] must de pend for the support of himself and his family on his private prac tice; it is not his fault that the service is ineffective ..." Not wishing to offend, Rose did not mention that it was a mat ter of common knowledge that the private physician who took the public health job was often the least competent physician in town, sometimes less interested in saving lives from filth-borne diseases than playing politics with the county commissioners and making a few hundred dollars a year. Not infrequently, the part-time health superintendent was a relative of the chairman of the county board.
All this made it more urgent to upgrade professional training in practical public health methods. Rose, disappointed in efforts to eradicate hookworm, saw county health departments as the better approach.
Yet one problem remained insoluble. The indifference or hostility that public health encountered in academic medicine ex tended all the way down to general practice at the grass roots. Grant It was an absurd promise to have to make and impossible to fulfill. In a rational attack on disease, the line between prevention and treatment must be crossed and recrossed many times. In any event, clinicians have not been wholly consistent in their devotion to care of the sick. Doctors in solo, fee-for-service practice have been con tent to leave medical care of indigent tuberculous, psychotic, and aged patients to county and state institutions. Organized medicine does not object to medical care at public expense for persons who cannot afford to pay. For the typical academic sub-specialist, on the other hand, the choice is less an economic one. Mainly interested in major diseases in their acute stages, he simply does not like intru sion on, or distraction from, what he is doing-whatever interests him.
Politics in H ig h P laces
Such was the background when Wickliffe Rose in December 1913, six months after incorporation of the Rockefeller Foundation, faced the public health manpower problem. At his instigation, the RF in a memorandum (Rockefeller Center Archives, RF, IHD files) invited the General Education Board "to consider the desirability of improving medical education in the United States with special view to the training of men for public health service." This was not a startling feat of communication, inasmuch as the trustees and of ficers of the two foundations were closely interlocked and mutually felicitous. The historian at this point cannot help but reflect on the quality of staff work that went into this memorandum, for it plainly sprang from the assumption that public health is a branch of medicine. As we shall see, some of the leading public health thinkers of the time did not agree this was so.
One other item, seemingly tangential, is exceedingly pertinent in a critical examination of the public health education decision to come. Harvard was competing with Johns Hopkins for large sums of money in support of medical education, and personalities were in volved.
Whereas Harvard had all other institutions in the country out- To be sure, Eliot had faced certain organizational handicaps in building a national medical school. One sort rose from the diffusion of the medical faculty in several hospitals and institutions with separate boards and differing objectives. Surveying this large, loose confederation, always a little baffling in its ramifications to the out sider, Eliot observed, "At Harvard, every tub sits on its own bot tom," and thereafter hoped for the best. The best materialized, in a remarkable display of intellectual individualism and humanist science, with each professor compelled to make his own way.
In May 1913, while Flexner still waited a decision from Welch, the new president of Harvard, A. Lawrence Lowell, applied to the GEB for $1.5 million to place clinical departments on "a satisfac tory university basis," meaning that professors would have offices on teaching hospital premises and devote the major part of their time to teaching and research, but would not be barred from receiv ing fees from private patients-in other words, serve "geographic full time." " But this," related Fosdick, "was not Flexner's idea of full time at all, and after some delay the application was declined." Flexner, in I Remember, made no mention of his role of David against the Harvard Goliath. Eliot and Lowell, nevertheless, remembered, and were furious with him.
All in all, it was not the best time for a decision on Rose's bid for some attention to the training of public health doctors.
A n A m e ric a n I n s titu te o f H y g ie n e
The General Education Board, as 1914 began, assigned Flexner to make a preliminary investigation of possible sites for an endowed school of public health. The story of Flexner's progress and the out come has until now remained buried in Rockefeller Foundation archives. It quickly became evident to him that everyone among public health leaders did not share the medical and legal assumption that the primary qualification of a public health doctor was a degree as doctor of medicine.
From Someone, he said, should go to Europe and look at hygiene science in Germany and public health administration in England and then present a concrete scheme, "with a view to ultimately es tablishing on an experimental basis one or two schools in connection with university and public health departments in such places as Boston and New York."
In response to an inquiry, Rosenau in January had told Flexner how much it would cost to support an independent school of public health-$750,000 a year for 10 years, including grounds, buildings, equipment, and permanent endowment of operating costs. Rosenau specified that the program should be coordinate with but not subor dinate to the medical school.
"A school for health officers to be a practical success must be a research workshop," he said. He would have seven departments: sanitary engineering, sanitary architecture, hygiene, demography, sanitary chemistry, public health administration, and tropical medicine, all with access to the medical, dental, and engineering schools.
Had his proposition been substantially approved, organized ef forts to solve the public health manpower problems might have es caped the curse of procrastination by a good five years. But Flexner was in no rush. Before he accepted Harvard, others would have to be considered. Columbia, for example, had an elaborate plan for a School of Sanitary Science and Public Health awaiting financial support. Using a pooled university faculty, as at Harvard, the school would be open to physicians and civil engineers working for a doctor of science degree in public health, and also to public health nurses, sanitary inspectors, health laboratory assistants, and local health of ficers. The inclusion of public health nurses and local health officers was important.
By the summer of 1914 Germany and Great Britain were at war, making a tour of these countries impossible. The thing to do, Flexner suggested, was to call a conference of American public health leaders and get their ideas. He was unable to do so until Oc tober 16, when the GEB held a one-day meeting in New York, bringing together 11 leaders in the field, plus nine RF and GEB At the other pole, Welch, retiring dean at Johns Hopkins, stressed the need for a broad training in basic sciences and fun damental principles: "The rest is application . . . [It] requires specialized training, but it almost takes care of itself, and it is easily supplied . .
Welch visualized a qualified health officer as a doctor of medicine with a hospital internship and two years of special train ing that would make him also a doctor of public health.
Biggs didn't agree with his old teacher:
While we all desire men who have this broad general training in hygiene, and who shall then add to it specialized training . . . we are not going to get them . . . What we want now are some men who are reasonably qualified to do the work . . . If we are to wait for a time when a school of public health shall turn out men who are graduates in medicine and have had hospital work and have had a two years' course in public health, we will wait . . . We will never attain that.
Gates, who presided, was undismayed. He said to Biggs:
Doctor, isn't it true th a t. . . many men who are practicing physicians, who have all the necessary qualifications . . . are not successful in practice; who have certain peculiarities of manner or lack of the graces . . . which "ring the doorbell" and bring them into full practice, and yet who are very able?
Biggs agreed this was so. Gates continued:
Now, why cannot there be a career for just such men right here, large numbers of them, too . . . Let these men . . . come to Dr. Welch's school for a more or less short time and fit themselves in the special services . . . and from those failures in practice draw your health of ficers?
Biggs gave ground: "I think that is what actually will happen." Strangely, no one thought to observe that, if public health was to be simply a haven for clinical medicine's misfits rather than stand on its own feet as a prideful profession, its attractiveness to a medical graduate seeking his niche would be about equal to that of a junk pile.
Instead, when Gates sounded out Welch on the question of ap peal, Welch said that a supply of qualified health officers would in crease the demand for them as the medical profession and public recognized their value, and then succumbed to his own enthusiasm: "I think the attractions in public health work almost surpass the at tractions in [clinical] practice today."
As the morning session ended, Biggs conducted a spirited counteroffensive against Welch's elaboration of an institute or department of hygiene that would be a part of niedical school-"Pettenkoffer's conception brought up to modern times," Welch called it. The displaced doctors of medicine, Biggs argued, should have the opportunity for special training in short courses, cor respondence courses, on-the-job training. Field training, equivalent to a hospital internship for a medical graduate, would be essential; it would require actual work in state and local health departments. It would be difficult for a school of public health tied to a single private university to obtain this kind of cooperation. It might work in a school of public health connected with a state university (but the GEB was committed to support of private medical schools).
To all this Whipple added the observation that the Harvard-MIT School for Health Officers wanted to give its students the fun damental education stressed by Welch, but found it necessary to take into account how long the public health student could afford to spend on education for a profession that would never bring him a large income. By eliminating the two clinical years of medicine and the one-year internship, three years could be saved, the student then being able to spend two years in public health and finish in four years instead of seven.
Rose caught the full implications of the confrontation between Biggs, the health department man, and Welch, the university scien tist. It was not in the balance a question of either/or but how to promote both the theory and practice of public health. In the after noon, Rose, who had not put a word in the record all morning, tossed out a wake-them-up statement: "It seemed to me quite possi ble, as an educational scheme, to bring to realization all the factors that were maintained . . ."
He now spoke at length, stressing that in thinking of a univer sity center for public health education it was important to relate it to a system of training in public health services for the country as a whole. First, it should be determined whether one or more of these central institutions of highest academic and scientific character were needed, then map the country in reference to future needs and pick the area offering the best opportunity for the first of these centers.
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The university center should be in a port city with its immigration element but not too remote from opportunities for rural health work. The objective would be to set public health standards for the nation. In addition to providing for a high quality of teaching and research:
It would seem to me extremely important also to provide for all these practical phases of the work, so that the institution might have, for its laboratory, the state health organization, city health organiza tion, and actual field work, and my conception of this central institu tion would be that it ought to cover the whole field of public health in struction, nothing left out however trivial.
Rose used Columbia Teachers College and state agriculture colleges as illustrations of his conception of academically indepen dent institutions serving as the hubs of social systems:
I do not believe that a mere university department of public health will ever perform the function for which this [proposed] institu tion is designed. In . . . the educational field, we cannot today name a department of education which has ever approximated Teachers Col lege in its development and achievement . . . for the educational profession . . . Teachers College within Columbia University is an en tity of its own . . . It has brought together there a body of men who consecrate their lives to the profession of teaching . . . a . . . social at mosphere in which has grown up our highest conception of the profes sion of teaching . . . The achievement at Teachers College is today felt all over the United States, and it has toned up the profession of teaching throughout the entire country.
As another example, he said, the agricultural college, when es tablished purely on the basis of science, attracted only a handful of students and did not affect the agriculture of the state. When it es tablished short courses and related them to the farmer, through the county farm agent and extension service, it became important to the farmer and attractive to his son. Instruction, as also demonstrated in the hookworm-control program in the South, needed to be car ried right out into the field. The public health specialist must go where the work is to be done, roll up his sleeves, and show the local workers what he wants.
. . . We must think, in the course of time, of each of the states as hav ing a simpler unit of instruction [than the university center] for the training of the rank and file in the public health service . . . however subordinate the position . . . You never can hope to get them to an in- This was Rose's vision. Public health is mainly public education, he said, and every health officer needs to be a teacher. Where would the students of public health come from? Rose would not take them as they came through the door, as the misfits of clinical medicine. This was not the way to find leaders in public health.
But if you organize a system by which you can go out over the country and select the young men who [have] native endowment and ideals and temperament and [are interested in] public health work already .. . and bring them into the institution, then you have a body of students who are going to affect things . . . That is perfectly feasible by a system of scholarships, properly organized and directed . . . Nothing further of importance was said that day. Welch, batting as it were in the clean-up position, endorsed Rose's systematized public health dream castle and empire, but liked the castle more than the empire.
I want to say I have never heard a more stirring and inspiring presentation . . . There is a great deal of vision in it, and I agree if we could only approach the realization . . . it would be a tremendous step forward .. . The most important thing is an institute of hygiene . . . with this broad conception . . . the center and home of these men . . . I think the point of Mr. Rose's, about getting the units of the different states, I think that would work itself out.
It was agreed in conclusion that Welch and Rose should get together and outline the essentials of this number one institute of hygiene (which Rosenau had sketched out for Flexner some months before). Welch felt that a description of this institute was the im mediate need; the planning of a larger system "could wait." No one debated this point. Rosenau avoided the awkward position of tooting his own horn and kept quiet. He was the leading candidate to direct such an institute. Welch rarely was so impolite as openly to oppose ideas that he did not care for, preferring softly to kiss them to sleep with some such remark as "It almost takes care of itself," "That would work itself out," or "It can wait."
The proposed institute of hygiene itself waited another four years. The RF asked Rose to go abroad as chairman of its first War Relief Commission in November 1914. Before he left, Rose sent Welch a first draft of a long memorandum entitled, "School of Public Health," which reduced his dream to paper. This draft, overlooked by public health historians, bore down heavily on the need for a "whole system of training for public health service," stating that the first school "should be conceived as an integral part of a system which shall be national in its scope and which shall make adequate provision for the training of all public health workers." Had it been possible to obey this injunction Surgeon General Thomas Parran, Livingston Farrand, and other public health authorities might have been saved their jeremiads a generation later, on the lack of adequate training of health officers. It is noteworthy that Rose's draft devoted as much attention to simpler state schools as it did to higher institutions, each related to the other in field work, extension teaching, and placement service.
Rose and Welch did not have a chance to get together until the following February. Welch agreed to work on the memorandum, but Rose had to press him to have it ready for the meeting of the GEB in May 1915.
The 3,000-word document that Welch presented there is of historic interest because it was the Declaration of Independence by which American schools of public health sought to differentiate themselves as training and research institutions while pledging al legiance to the university and avowing a close alliance with the medical school.
The Welch-Rose memorandum, now entitled "Institute of Hygiene," agreed that the primary need was for men (there was mention of public health nurses) to operate the country's public health services. It pointed out that physicians in practice also ought to be well-grounded in hygiene and preventive medicine, a Welch amendment. Cultivation of hygiene as a science "should be a fun damental aim." The scope of interest was equally theory and prac tice, but it was more desirable to conceive such an institution as providing a good general education in all branches of hygiene than training various classes of workers for higher or lower grades. At tempting to resolve the plaguing question of "public health" being something like a pot without a handle, they said, "Unity is to be found rather in the end to be accomplished-the preservation and improvement of health-than in the means essential to the end." Not a subject but an object made public health a distinct career, in other words.
While the foundation staffs always called the document the "Welch-Rose proposal," whether it represented a complete meeting of the minds under the circumstances is doubtful. There was no further discussion of founding "one or more" of these national schools of public health or hygiene. It was one. Whereas Rose had a department of public health administration and a department of public health nursing in his school of public health, the Welchian in stitute of hygiene swept these aside as major components. Welch eliminated all but one fleeting reference to a system of state schools, and there is no record of Rose ever having mentioned the subject again. It was conceded that the proposed institute itself could meet only a small part of the manpower problem:
The far-reaching influences of the institute should be felt in the advancement of science and the improvement of the practice of public health, in establishing higher standards and better methods of profes sional education in this field, in stimulating the foundation of similar institutes in other parts of the country, in supplying teachers and in cooperating with schools of simpler character designed for brief technical training which should be established in each state in connec tion jointly with boards of health and medical schools.
Conditions for admission to the institute were left for future consideration, but it was assumed that "while the majority of can didates for diplomas and degrees will doubtless be graduates in medicine, these distinctions would not be limited to physicians." What certificates or degrees should be offered were not discussed.
Welch stressed a favorite hope of his that had not concerned Rose. Education in hygiene should be available to physicians headed for clinical medicine. "The mission of the practicing physician is in many respects changing, and there can be no doubt that a year or more of graduate work in hygiene would be eagerly sought by many physicians . . . if the proper opportunities for such work were provided." So saying, he appeared to have lost his license to practice as a prophet. Such an eagerness never emerged. On the contrary, clinical training discouraged it.
C hoose O n e
No one appeared to be in a position or of a disposition to change the course of events once Welch had declared himself. The GEB at a meeting in May 1915 accepted the Welch-Rose memorandum and suggested that the RF and its International Health Board conduct further investigations. The confreres of 1914 were never reconvened, and the memorandum was circulated among them for comments only after the GEB had acted. Flexner was silent.
Meanwhile, Harvard embarrassed itself with its own eagerness. In May, the university applied to the Rockefeller Foundation for support of Strong's School of Tropical Medicine, definitely "in program." In June, after the Welch-Rose document was available, Lowell amended the application to request money for an institute of hygiene that would include tropical medicine.
Welch, having asked for nothing, was in a better strategic posi tion than Eliot to bring home the bacon. Whereas Eliot was on both Rockefeller boards of trustees, Welch was on neither; he was simply a member of the International Health Board. But he was now linked with the much-respected Wickliffe Rose as the co-creator of this academic Galatea and was being quietly viewed by some as her chief suitor. It did not seem altogether fitting to appoint the eligible bachelor to a committee to select the bridegroom. Flexner, in reality Welch's matchmaker; Greene, pro-Harvard; and Rose, neutral to the soles of his tiny shoes, formed the subcommittee now appointed to consider, in the idiom of the moment, "the more concrete aspects of the subject, such as a possible university connection and mode of organization"-in other words, "Where the devil do we put this in stitution?" Resolution of this question, linked with the equally im portant one, "Who is going to run it?" consumed another six months.
If the entire pace of the founding of the first endowed school of public health in America proceeded at the same labored tempo as an Italian grand opera, there were good reasons for it, quite aside from the merits of Johns Hopkins or Harvard, or Rosenau or Welch. It is painful for philanthropy to look upon its nonprofit friends, judge them, and choose one or another to receive its gift. It is, of course, even more agonizing for a would-be beneficiary to be judged and found wanting.
Rose, Flexner, and Greene made a survey of "all fairly possible situations" in the fall of 1915 and early 1916. These were Harvard, Columbia, Johns Hopkins, The University of Pennsylvania, The University of Chicago, Washington University of St. Louis, and Tulane University. Actual site visits were made in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and New Orleans. State univer sities, such as Michigan, were not considered.
The procedure at each institution was to interview everyone, from the university president to the city health officer, who would be involved in the program. Thus, at Harvard, the Rockefeller trio began with Lowell. Flexner led the questioning. He wasted no time inquiring about the scientific advances of importance to public health made by the faculty of the School for Health Officers, but concentrated on the administrative structure of the Medical School, comparing the loose affair that was Harvard with the tight organization at Johns Hopkins. The lack of Harvard interest in the pattern of a full-time clinical faculty, which his efforts had in troduced at Johns Hopkins, was in his mind, but he frankly ex pressed bafflement at the duality of accountability among profes sors who served under two boards of trustees, the university on the one hand and one of several hospitals on the other, and yet manifested a loyalty to a third party, the medical faculty. At one point, he said:
The difficulty from my point of view is that I do not see as there is any very definite or reliable machinery for the upbuilding of the clinical staff on the same basis that would operate in other depart ments of the University. The extent to which the absence of that machinery is compensated for by the existence of these under standings and loyalties I am in no position to say . . . What I would like to grasp is just what could be counted on as a machinery within the Medical School for taking advantage of every vacancy that occurs to fill it in a way that is sympathetic with the objects of such a com bined enterprise as we have in mind.
"Perhaps you exaggerate the difficulties that come from this organization and under-estimate the advantages," Lowell de murred. After two or three days of this, there was a feeling among the men of Harvard that Abe Flexner did not understand them or the unity they found in academic freedom and common goals.
And, of course, he had appeared totally unconscious of the fun damental issue in the minds of some, that they were interested in creating a professional career in public health quite distinct from clinical medicine. It is impossible to say whether his action was deliberate, but when Flexner returned to New York, he discovered that he had been guilty of a shameful goof while in Boston. He had failed to see William Thompson Sedgwick, the exponent of a Fall 1976 / Health and Society / M M F Q separate educational track in public health. Worse, he realized that he had not invited Sedgwick to the New York conference the year before. He now wrote an apology: "How it happened . . . I am utter ly unable to say . . . but I assure you that the omission was uninten tional and inadvertent. . ." Unruffled, Sedgwick wrote back that he was glad to learn there was nothing intentional in leaving him out, and happy that his students were there-Jordan, Whipple, Winslow, Jackson, and his friend, Rosenau. What can the historian say, other than that Flexner was a failing student in public health and guilty of careless staff work, or hopelessly biased? Or, Rose was not up to a contest with Flexner.
Flexner, Rose, and Greene visited Johns Hopkins last. By this time, his colleagues had twitted Flexner about his rank favoritism, as may be seen from his remarks during the course of an interview with Theodore Janeway, the new full-time professor of medicine, replacing Barker. Janeway discoursed on the joy of working in a un iversity medical school where "There is absolute cooperation." Flexner said, " I am suspected by Mr. Rose and Mr. Greene and others as having a very close Hopkins interest, so it is extremely im portant for me to bring out anything that is unfavorable. Can't you tell us anything unpleasant . . .?" Dr. Janeway complained that his medical clinic was spread out over three blocks and his laboratories were cramped. This sounded a bit like Harvard. Later, pressing William H. Howell, professor of physiology, to "get something in this record unsatisfactory about Hopkins," Flexner elicited the reply: " It is too poor to start with." This also sounded like a Harvard view.
Then followed a discussion of how long it would take to reach the Engineering School on the Homewood campus by bus or street car. The geographic separation of the Medical School from the un iversity campus did seem to be a flaw-one shared by Harvard and many others. Again, any inquiry into the contributions of the scholars and scientists took a back seat to organization and management. The discussion gave no hint that Howell was a pioneer in the studies of blood coagulation and was, in fact, co-discoverer of the anti-coagulant heparin. When it came to famous medical scien tists, John Hopkins and Harvard were on a par.
Ten days later, in January 1916, Flexner, Rose, and Greene presented the " final report of the General Education Board" to the R ockefeller Foundation, reviewing the institutional and organizational virtues and vices of Harvard, Columbia, Penn sylvania, and Johns Hopkins. Now the proud flesh of philanthropy would don its judicial robes. The last paragraph established the direction of their thinking:
The situation at Baltimore may then be formulated as follows: The general resources of the University and of the community are inferior-in some respect much inferior-to those found in New York, Boston, and Philadelphia; the Medical School fulfills the re quisite conditions in the highest degree anywhere obtainable. The schools of public health in Boston and Baltimore had much in common in their exciting research contributions, too numerous to be described here, and also in their lack of strong, effective, community-service orientation, meaning, as Sedgwick insisted, close, working relationships with state and county health departments-and, in a newer mode, community health centers.
Neither of the two schools was able to resolve the comparative merits of segregation from the medical school versus integration with it. Wilson G. Smillie (1955) commented on Welch's conviction that a Hopkins "institute of hygiene" in association with the medical school would not only train health officers but provide much sought-after instruction in preventive medicine for physicians going into general practice:
Subsequent events were to demonstrate that, although the first part of his vision was to be fully realized, the second part was only a mirage. Forty years were to pass before the influence of this great school broke through the solid barrier of a single narrow street.
Whereas the Hopkins school of public health became so con-
